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ABSTRACT. Rare earth elements (REE) contain unique chemical and physical 
properties such as lanthanum, are found in small concentrations, need extensive 
precise processes to separate, and are critical components of modern technologies 
such as laser guidance systems, personal electronics such as IPhones, satellites, and 
military weapons systems as varied as Virginia-class fast attack submarines, DDG-
51 Aegis destroyers, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, and precision guided munitions.  
The U.S. has some rare earth resources, but is heavily dependent on access to them 
from countries as varied as Afghanistan, Bolivia, and China. Losing access to these 
resources would have significant adverse economic, military, and political implica- 
tions for the U.S. and its allies if their supply sources are restricted or eliminated. 
This article will examine the critical strategic importance of these resources, the 
historical origins and contemporary development of U.S. policy toward strategic 
minerals, and how multiple U.S. Government agencies are involved in this emerging 
policymaking arena. It features significant use of U.S. and foreign government 
statistics and analyses and scholarly journal literature. It will conclude by suggesting 
efforts to limit the severity of this problem to the U.S.’ economy and national security 
interests. 
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Multiple factors influence the formulation and implementation of U.S. foreign 
and national security policy. Besides the numerous economic, political, and 
psychological factors in such policymaking, the role of accessing and having 
dependable supplies to natural resources plays a paramount role. Most ob- 
servers of international relations and security are familiar with the importance 
of oil and natural gas in these areas. More attention, however, needs to be 
devoted to the role played by other natural resources, including minerals, in 
U.S. foreign and national security policies. The role of Rare Earth Elements 
(REEs) is of particular importance due to the weakness of the U.S.’ domestic 
REE industry and its dependence on foreign suppliers, particularly China, 
for its access to these materials which have become deeply interwoven into 
the U.S.’ civilian economy and to its national security infrastructure. Failure 
by the U.S. to expand the growth of its REE industry could make it econom- 
ically and militarily vulnerable to supply disruptions from China and other 
foreign suppliers who are antagonistic to U.S. economic and strategic interests.1 
 
What Are Rare Earth Elements? 
 
REE are 15 elements ranging from atomic number 57 (Lanthanum) to 71 
(Lutetium) on the periodic table of elements. In addition, atomic number 39 
(Yttrium) and atomic number 21 (Scandium) are also regarded as REEs 
because of similar chemical and physical properties. Light REEs cover from 
Lanthum to atomic number 64 (Gadolinium) and heavy REEs cover from 
atomic number 65 (Terbium) to Lutetium. REEs are not defined as rare due 
to supply shortages, but due to their identification during the 18th and 19th 
centuries as being materials which could not be changed further by heat 
unlike lime or magnesia. Atomic number 58 (Cerium) is the most abundant 
REE and is more common in the Earth’s crust than copper or lead and all 
REEs, except Atomic number 61 (Promethium) are most abundant on average 
in the earth’s crust than silver, gold, or platinum. 











    Figure 1 Rare Earth Elements 
     
    Source: U.S. Geological Survey 
 
U.S. and International Civilian Uses of REEs 
 
REEs are significantly integrated into a multiplicity of civilian applications 
in the U.S. and internationally. They make phosphors (substances emitting 
luminescence) for ray tubes and flat screen displays ranging in size from smart 
phone displays to stadium scoreboards with some REEs used in fluorescent 
and LED lighting. The glass industry is the largest single consumer of REE 
raw materials using them for glass polishing and additives providing color 
and special optical properties. Lanthanum consists of nearly 50% of digital 
camera lenses including cell phone cameras. Catalysts of this element are 
also used to refine petroleum and cerium-based catalysts are used in auto- 
mobile catalytic converters.3 
     Magnets deploying REEs are receiving frequent use with neodymium-
iron-boron magnets being the strongest known magnets and are very useful 
when space and weight are limiting factors. REE magnets are used in com- 
puter hard disks and CD-ROM and DVD disk drives. Disk drive spindles 
attain high stability in their spinning motion when driven by a REE magnet. 
Such magnets are also used in multiple conventional auto subsystems 
including power steering, electric windows, power seats, and audio speakers. 
Nickel-metal hydrides are built with lanthanum-based alloys as anodes and 
can be used as batteries in hybrid electric cars requiring 10–15 kilograms per 
vehicle. Other REEs, including cerium, lanthanum, neodymium, and praseo- 
dymium, commonly used as a mixed oxide called mischmetal, are used in 
steel making to remove impurities and in producing special alloys.4 
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Global Dispersion of REEs 
 
Global REE resources are distributed throughout the world with only a small 
percentage being available in the U.S. A 2008 National Research Council 
report stressed that REEs rank high on the “criticality” factor of raw materials 
emphasizing they possess high technological and economic importance along 
with high supply side risk. This assessment went on to maintain that critical 
material availability can and will change as production technologies evolve 
and new products are developed, that the U.S. Government defines a critical 
mineral as one with essential uses and subject to supply restriction risk, the 
longer it takes to substitute a mineral increases cost and expense and in- 
creases the impact of mineral supply disruption, significant short and medium-
term mineral supply disruptions may occur due to significant demand increase, 
thin markets, product concentration, production predominantly as a by-
product, and lack of available old-scrap for recycling or the infrastructure 
required for recycling, long-term mineral and mineral product availability 
requires continued minerals education spending, and that import dependence 
alone is not a useful risk indicator but imports can be vulnerable to disruption 
if supply is concentrated in one or more REE exporting countries with high 
political risk or where significantly increasing internal demand may cause 
indigenous REE production to be directed to internal consumption.5 
    The following section will describe the REE resources, industries, and 
governmental policymaking of selected countries besides the U.S. which 
begins with charts showing global REE distribution. 
 
Figure 2 Global Map of REE Dispersion 
 
Source: U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) 
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Figure 3 Global Mine Production of Rare Earth Minerals in Different Countries 
 
Source: Hydrometallurgy 165 (October 2016): 6. 
 
Afghanistan – The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) reports that Afghani- 
stan’s Helmand Province contains REEs and uranium with these concentrated 
in the Khan Neshin carbonite complex uncovered by Soviet investigators in 
the 1970s and confirmed by subsequent Afghan and USGS geological 
investigations. Their estimate of undiscovered REE deposits include a mean 
expected value of 1.4 million metric tons of REE and 3.48 million metric 
tons of niobium which, while not a REE, is considered a critical strategic 
material due to its use in various superconducting purposes including elec- 
tronics, nuclear industries, and optics. Afghanistan has been unable to achieve 
significant development of its REE industry due to violent conditions and 
lack of infrastructure including electricity, mining and mineral processing 
facilities, and roads. However, these factors have not unduly restricted China’s 





















Helmand Province has seen repeated fighting between the U.S., international 
coalition allies, and the Afghanistan Government against the Taliban. 
Operation Moshtarak lasting over several months in 2010 resulted in an 
eventual military victory for the U.S. and its allies. The June 2017 edition of 
the Defense Department’s report Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghan- 
istan documented ongoing military operations in Helmand and Kandahar 
provinces including the Taliban claiming responsibility for fatal January 10, 
2017 attacks in these provinces, ongoing Taliban efforts to contest and seize 
population and communication centers in these regions persist, and three U.S. 
military personnel were wounded during a March 20, 2017 insider attack at a 
Helmand Province military base.7  
 
Figure 6 Map of Southwest Afghanistan including Helmand Province 
 
Source: Institute for the Study of War 
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Australia – Mineral resources have played and continuing playing critically 
important roles in Australian economic prosperity and strategic interests.8  
During 2015, Australian mineral exports (except petroleum products) were 
AUS $141 billion representing 56% of export merchandise, 45% of exported 
goods and services, and nearly 9% of Gross Domestic Product. 2015 Aus- 
tralian REE resources are estimated to be 3.44 million metric tons (MT) up 
from 3.19 million MT in 2013. This represents approximately 2.6% of the 
world’s estimated total of 130 MT. Growth in Australian REE stem from 
resource upgrades at Yangibana (Hastings Technology Metals Ltd) and 
Browns Range (Northern Minerals Ltd) in Western Australia and Nolans Bore 
(Arafura Resources Ltd) in the Northern Territory. Lynas Corporation Ltd 
operates Australia’s only rare earths mine at Mount Weld, Western Australia 
which supplies Rare Earth concentrates to the Lynas Advanced Materials Plant 
(LAMP) in Malaysia. Mount Weld produces on a LAMP demand basis and 
in 2015 produced 10,900 tons of ready-for-sale RE oxides making Australia 
second only to China which generates 85% of this production.9  
 
Figure 7 Australian REE Locations 
 
Source: Geosciences Australia 
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In 2011, Australia and the U.S. signed a Reciprocal Security of Supply 
Agreement to ensure that each country provided the other a reciprocal 
priority and supply of defense products, materials, and services to discharge 
their military commitments according to their foreign and security policy 
requirements.10 
 
Canada – Canada’s geographic and geological expanses also feature poten- 
tially substantive REE reserves and Canada has a demonstrated a successful 
historical and contemporary record of mineral resources extraction. It has been 
estimated that there are over 200 individual REE demonstration projects at 
various stages of development in Canada with the following chart demon- 
strating potential future REE mines: 
 
Figure 8 Rare Earth Projects (Potential Future Mines) 
Source: Natural Resources Canada, brief presented to the Committee, 25 November 2013   
 
Canadian Government officials have identified 11 REE projects in advanced 
exploration stage which are all Canadian owned. The capital expenditure 
requirements of developing a Canadian rare earth mine are estimated to range 
from $CAN 106 million–$2.5 billion which are much higher than mining 
traditional metals like copper. The House of Commons Natural Resources 
Committee learned that developing a Canadian REE mine could take between 
7–10 years involving multiple development stages including prefeasibility 
studies and environmental assessment with the following chart reflect the 
multifaceted permitting process.11 
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Figure 9 Front-End REE Supply Chain 
 
Source: Natural Resources Canada, brief presented to the Committee, 25 November 2013, and 
the Canadian Rare Earth Elements Network, brief presented to the Committee, 13 February 
2014 
 
The Canadian Government has pledged to promote research on environ- 
mentally cleaner and more efficient REE and chromite extraction. Ottawa 
maintains that REEs are key components facilitating a transition to clean 
technologies behind a transition to a low carbon economy. Such programs 
are believed to deliver process efficiencies; economic and market analyses to 
inform technology gaps; laboratory and pilot-scale testing facilities; and highly 
qualified personnel to position Canada to develop a strategic market for 
REEs. Additional outputs of REE related spending are projected to include 
developing and demonstrating technologies to increase mining operational 
productivity, including techniques to break rocks without explosives in order 
to save time and money; engineering rock bolts (for stabilizing rock excava- 
tions) with sensors to monitor rock bolt integrity; and advancing development 
of a facility to cost-effectively test ground support systems.12 
     Testifying before the House of Commons Natural Resource Committee 
on February 25, 2014, Pierre Neatby, Vice-President of Avalon Rare Metals, 
stressed Canada’s political and economic stability and mining engineering 
excellence as giving Ottawa the opportunity to become a reliable alternative 
REE supplier: 
 
Canada has a history of mining excellence and companies that are 
looking for rare-earth products outside of China are looking for a 
culturally, politically stable country to invest in, and Canada fits 
that description. Some of the other projects that we’re competing 
against, whether they be in South Africa, Kyrgyzstan…. Those 
countries may not be seen as being as politically stable as a Canada, 
or a U.S., or an Australia. So having the Canadian government make 
a signal to these potential investors that Canada is supportive of rare 
earths would help us tremendously in attracting that investment.13 
 
China – China is the world’s preeminent producer, consumer, and exporter 
of REE’s and has demonstrated the willingness to use its geopolitical 
leverage in this arena to seek to achieve economic and strategic objectives.  
Beijing possesses almost 95% of global REE reserves. At the end of 2014, 
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21 mining companies and over 100 processing companies were registered 
with Beijing’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology for a cumu- 
lative total rare-earth mining capacity of 300,000 tons annually and an annual 
rare-earth production capacity of 60,000 tons annually. Additional secondary 
rare-earth products are also produced from waste materials by some recycling 
companies.   
     January 2014 saw China’s State Council approve a rare-earth industry in- 
tegration plan prepared by the Ministry of Industry and Information Tech- 
nology and other agencies to consolidate six large rare-earth companies and 
improve the industry’s international competitiveness. These six companies 
are: 
 
Aluminum Corporation of China Ltd. 
(CHINALCO) 
Integrates REE companies in Guangxi, 
Jiangsu, Shandong, and Sichuan. 
Baogang Group Integrates REE companies in Gansu 
and Inner Mongolia. 
China Minmetals Corporation Integrates REE companies in Hunan 
plus companies it has in Fujian, 
Guangdong, Jiangxi, and Yunnan. 
Ganzhou Mining Group Integrates REE companies in Jianxi. 
Guangdong Rising Nonferrous Group Integrates REE companies in 
Guangdong. 
Xiamen Tungsten Group Integrates REE companies in Fujian.14 
 





China’s REE Geopolitical Leverage 
 
China’s essentially monopolistic control of global REE reserves and its 
extensive exports of these resources have caused concerns that it might use 
this preeminent position to engage in geopolitical leverage against the U.S. 
and other REE importing countries to achieve geopolitical and strategic 
objectives detrimental to the importing countries. Chinese preeminence in 
the global REE market has occurred since the mid-1980s due to China’s 
economic growth which has exponentially increased its appetite for REE’s, a 
declining U.S. REE industry due to higher labor costs compared with China, 
environmental problems at the U.S. Mountain Pass Mine in California which 
resulted in this mine being temporarily shut down as a result of stringent 
U.S. regulatory and environmental laws, and lower Chinese labor costs and 
environmental standards.15 
     An analysis of a how a potential 2030 confrontation between the U.S. and 
its allies against China over Taiwan and the South China Sea could injure U.S. 
and allied access to REEs is described as follows: 
        
The numerous weapons systems that rely on rare earths technology 
place the United States at a strategic disadvantage with regards to 
China. If a prolonged large-scale conflict between the two conflicts 
broke out over a Taiwan Strait or South China Sea dispute, the 
United States may find itself squeezed to obtain sufficient supplies 
of rare earths to manufacture replacement parts or systems to remain 
engaged in the fight. Much as the lack of secure access to oil was 
crippling to the Germans at the end of World War II, rare earths 
could play a similar, pivotal role in a future conflict with China.  
In the air-to-air arena alone, the requirement to replace expended 
stockpiles of advanced air-to-air missiles could become a factor 
very quickly based on the number of aircraft China would be 
capable of employing.16 
 
In July 2010, China’s Ministry of Commerce announced a 725% reduction 
in Rare Earth Oxide exports for the second half of that year limiting annual 
REE exports to 30,258 tons. In December 2010, Beijing announced that its 
REE export quotas for the first half of 2011 would be 14,508 tons or an 11% 
reduction. China also demonstrated its intention to use REEs as geopolitical 
leverage when a Japanese Coast Guard vessel attempted to stop a Chinese 
fishing boat from illegally fishing in Japanese waters in the East China Sea 
with the Japanese ship ramming the Chinese vessel and apprehending its 
captain. An ensuing political split resulted in suspension of high-level con- 
tacts between Beijing and Tokyo and China temporarily withholding REE 
exports to Japan.17 
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World Trade Organization Ruling and U.S. Expressions of Concern 
 
Many U.S. Government and other sources have expressed concern about 
China’s REE export quotas and monopolistic dominance of the global REE 
market. On March 13, 2012, the U.S. requested consultations with China on 
Beijing’s REE restrictions. Then U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk main- 
tained “America’s workers and manufacturers are being hurt in both estab- 
lished and budding industrial sectors by these policies. China continues to 
make its export restraints more restrictive, resulting in massive distortions 
and harmful disruptions in supply chains for these materials throughout the 
global marketplace.”18 On March 22, 2012, the European Union and Japan 
requested the World Trade Organization (WTO) to join this forum’s consul- 
tation on these export quotas with Canada requesting to join these consul- 
tations on March 26, 2012. China allowed these countries to participate in 
the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Board (DSB) process with the U.S. request- 
ing that a DSB be established on June 27, 2012. A DSB was established by 
the WTO later in 2012 with countries as varied as Australia, Brazil, India, 
Japan, and Saudi Arabia participating.19  
     Following over two years of deliberations, the WTO ruled on August 29, 
2014, that China’s export duties on rare earths, tungsten, and molybdenum 
were inconsistent with its accession to the WTO, that these duties were in- 
consistent with Article 11 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) prohibiting trade restrictions besides duties, taxes, and other charges, 
and that Chinese restrictions on the trading rights of REE and molybdenum 
exporting companies were inconsistent with justificatory arguments expressed 
by China in its position paper on this dispute.20 
    China eliminated the REE export duties in January 2015 replacing them 
with a resources tax. This tax was announced by China’s Ministry of Finance 
and State Administration of Taxation on April 30, 2015, setting the following 
levels for these categories of REEs, tungsten and molybdenum: 
 
Light Rare Earth 11.5% in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, 9.5% in Sichuan 
Province, 7.5% in Shandong Province 




U.S. concern over Chinese REE monopoly has been expressed in numerous 
venues. A 2014 article in Joint Force Quarterly described how Afghanistan’s 
need for money could allow it to be drawn into China’s geopolitical orbit as 
Beijing seeks to enhance its influence over Kabul’s REE reserves.22 A 2010 
article in this same Defense Department journal, published before the tem- 
porary Chinese ban on REE exports to Japan, reported that an online Chinese 
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Communist Party newspaper and several Chinese blogs encouraged banning 
the sale of REEs to U.S. companies following the Obama Administration 
approving a $6.4 billion arms sale to Taiwan. This article contended that 
China has been looking at possible military applications of REEs since the 
1960s, that Beijing has engaged in some REE research collaboration with 
Iran and North Korea, and that Beijing’s REE reserves, research activities, 
and capabilities could potentially give it a decisive edge in military tech- 
nologies in comparison with the U.S.23 
     A 2016 report by the Obama Administration’s National Science and 
Technology Council (NSTC) acknowledged that REEs and related materials 
including platinum-group metals, antimony, vanadium, tungsten, and germa- 
nium consistently fell into the category of strategically critical materials.  
However, it sidestepped the national security implications of U.S. dependence 
on unstable and potentially hostile foreign suppliers with the following 
bureaucratic rhetorical obfuscation: 
 
For minerals ultimately identified as critical, it is fair to wonder 
what can be done to decrease the associated risks and vulner- 
abilities. As illustrated by Ku and Hung, there is a hierarchy of 
strategies that can be adopted to help reduce mineral supply risks. 
These strategies range from short-term efforts aimed at developing 
strategic inventories and implementing fixed-price contracts, to 
medium-term efforts such as improving efficiencies by reducing 
waste and increasing recovery rates throughout the life cycle, to 
longer-term efforts that include material redesign and elemental 
and system-level substitution. Where these efforts are best targeted 
can be informed by the subsequent in-depth analyses.24 
 
Russia – As a prominent geopolitical factor in global energy policy, Russia 
plays a lesser but potentially significant role in the international REE equation.  
The 1990s saw the role of REEs in Russian economic, military, and political 
calculations began to increase with REE resources being estimated as ranging 
from 18–22% of the world’s total and with existing and potential resources 
and processing plants concentrated geographically in both European and 
Asian Russia in locales as varied as the Irkutsk and Murmansk Oblasts and 
Yakutia. During July 2013, the Russian Federation Government established 
rules governing the formation of a Federal Reserve Fund for subsoil lots 
containing minerals. February 2013 saw the Russian President issue a decree 
outlining a strategy for enhancing mineral industry development in the Arctic 
through 2020 despite Russian REE production falling from 2,600 metric tons 
to 2,100 metric tons between 2009 and 2013. It is highly probable that 
Russia will seek to use existing and potential REE resources to enhance its 
strategic position and may seek to do so in collaboration with China.25 
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Figure 11 Selected Map of Russian European REE Resource Sites 
 
Source: European Journal of Mineralogy, 12(6), 2000: 1230. 
 
United States – U.S. interest in documenting indigenous mineral resources 
holdings predates the 1879 establishment of the U.S. Geological Survey 
(USGS). An 1833 report to Congress by the Secretary of War Lewis Cass 
(1782–1866) called for the U.S. Government to document and map such 
resources.26 
 
Figure 12 Report from the Secretary of War 
 
Source: ProQuest Congressional 
 65 
Subsequent decades have seen the U.S. place increasing emphasis on develop- 
ing, conserving, and using indigenous mineral resources for a variety of 
civilian and military applications. As military arsenals have become more 
technologically advanced they have frequently required refined mineral 
resources to make effective use of these weapons to achieve strategic and 
national security objectives. While some of these mineral resources have been 
available domestically, others have only been available from foreign suppliers 
of sometimes questionable reliability. This has resulted in Congress enacting 
legislation requiring multiple federal agencies to ensure the U.S. military and 
civilian economy have dependable access to critically important strategic 
resources such as REEs.27 
 
Key U.S. Government Legislation 
 
The past several decades have seen the U.S. Government enact numerous 
statutes intended to ensure the U.S. has access to critical natural resources 
and other materials for national security and domestic needs. The 1933 Buy 
American Act sought to protect U.S. businesses and labor by restricting the 
acquisition and end use of “non-domestic” products and construction materi- 
als. This statute has essentially defined these categories as unmanufactured 
end products or construction materials defined or produced in the U.S. and 
end products or construction materials manufactured in the U.S. provided 
that their cost of components manufactured, mined, or produced in the U.S. 
exceeds 50% of the cost of all components or the product is a commercially 
available off-the-shelf item. End products or construction materials not 
qualifying as domestic under these definitions are generally treated as foreign, 
offers supplying foreign end products or construction materials or foreign 
offers regardless of the suppliers’ nationality, and purchases of services are 
generally not subject to the Buy American Act.28 
    This statute features five exceptions including: 
 
1. Procuring domestic goods or using domestic construction materials is 
inconsistent with the national interest. 
2. Domestic end products or construction materials are unavailable. 
3. The contracting officer determines the costs or domestic end products or 
construction materials is unreasonable. 
4. The agency is procuring information technology as a commercial item. 
5. The goods are required specifically for commissary resale.29 
 
The 1939 Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling Act was the first time 
the term “critical material” appeared in U.S. statutory language. A key 
provision of this statute’s intent declares: 
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The Congress finds that the natural resources of the United States 
in certain strategic and critical materials are deficient or insuffi- 
ciently developed to supply the military, industrial, and essential 
civilian needs of the United States for national defense. (b) It is the 
purpose of this Act to provide for the acquisition and retention of 
stocks of certain strategic and critical materials and to encourage 
the conservation and development of sources of such materials 
within the United States and thereby to decrease and to preclude, 
when possible, a dangerous and costly dependence by the United 
States upon foreign sources or a single point of failure for supplies 
of such materials in times of national emergency. (c) The purpose 
of the National Defense Stockpile is to serve the interest of 
national defense only. The National Defense Stockpile is not to be 
used for economic or budgetary purposes.30 
 
Subsequent amendments to this statute in 1946, 1980, and 1984 represent the 
foundation of U.S. national minerals and materials policy while providing 
for the establishment of institutions such as the National Defense Stockpile 
and National Critical Materials Council.31 
     1941 saw Congress enact a set of domestic source restrictions which would 
eventually become known as the Berry Amendment and sought to require 
that most DOD purchased items be grown, processed, and reused in the U.S.  
This legislation would cause and continues causing considerable confusion 
for DOD purchasers and lawyers in subsequent decades and apply to areas as 
varied as strategic minerals and military clothing.32  
     The 1950 Defense Production Act (DPA) was enacted in response to 
critical materials shortages encountered during World War II and the Korean 
War’s onset. This statute expands presidential powers to give the President a 
broad set of authorities to influence domestic industry to benefit national 
defense. Broad examples of these expansive authorities include allowing the 
President to require persons (including businesses and corporations) to prior- 
itize and accept contracts for national defense related materials and services, 
incentivizing the domestic industrial base to expand production and supply 
of critical materials and goods via loans, loan guarantees, direct purchases, 
and purchase commitments along with authority to purchase and install 
equipment in private industrial facilities. Additional provisions of this statute 
include the authority to establish voluntary agreements with private industry; 
authority to block proposed or pending foreign corporate mergers, acqui- 
sitions, or takeovers threatening national security, and authority to employ 
persons with requisite experience or ability and establish a pool of volunteer 
industry executives who could be called to government service for national 
defense purposes.33 
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     The 1988 Exon-Florio Amendment to this statute designates the Committee 
on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), an interagency entity 
chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury, as the mechanism through which 
the President acts to investigate and suspend corporate mergers and acqui- 
sitions or transactions which may be injurious to national security. In 1990, 
the CFIUS ordered the China National Aero-Technology Import and Export 
Corporation to divest itself of Seattle’s NAMCO manufacturing and in 2005 
CFIUS halted Chinese-owned Lenovo’s acquisition of IBM’s personal com- 
puter and laptop division.34 
     1973 saw congressional enactment of the Specialty Metals Clause which 
saw the 1973 Defense Appropriations Act incorporate specialty metals into 
the Berry Amendment. Specialty metals are used in components purchased 
by DOD for aircraft weapons, equipment, and within integrated circuits, 
wiring, and electrical components. Examples of specialty metals include 
certain types of cobalt, nickel, steel, titanium and titanium alloys, and 
zirconium and zirconium base alloy. These metals were separated from the 
Berry Amendment in 2007. Numerous exceptions exist for requiring domestic 
purchase of specialty metals including national security waivers, when they 
are bought to support U.S. combat or contingency operations outside the U.S., 
when electrical components are involved, and when the Secretary of Defense 
certifies in writing that such materials are needed for national security.35 
    The 1980 National Materials and Minerals Policy Research and Develop- 
ment Act sought to reiterate the critical importance of the U.S. having 
sufficient supplies of critical materials for domestic economic and national 
security needs stressing: 
 
The Congress declares that it is the continuing policy of the United 
States to promote an adequate and stable supply of materials 
necessary to maintain national security, economic well-being and 
industrial production, with appropriate attention to a long-term 
balance between resource production, energy use, a healthy envi- 
ronment, natural resources conservation, and social needs. The 
Congress further declares that implementation of this policy 
requires that the President shall, through the Executive Office of 
the President, coordinate the responsible departments and agencies 
to, among other measures – (1) identify materials needs and assist 
in the pursuit of measures that would assure the availability of 
materials critical to commerce, the economy, and national security; 
(2) establish a mechanism for the coordination and evaluation of 
Federal materials programs, including those involving research and 
development so as to complement related efforts by the private 
sector as well as other domestic and international agencies and  
organizations; (3) establish a long-range assessment capability 
concerning materials demands, supply and needs, and provide for 
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the policies and programs necessary to meet those needs; (4) 
promote a vigorous, comprehensive, and coordinated program of 
materials research and development consistent with the policies 
and priorities set forth in the National Science and Technology 
Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976 (42 U.S.C. 6601 
et seq.); (5) promote cooperative research and development 
programs with other nations for the equitable and frugal use of 
materials and energy; (6) promote and encourage private enterprise 
in the development of economically sound and stable domestic 
materials industries; and (7) encourage Federal agencies to facilitate 
availability and development of domestic resources to meet critical 
materials needs.36 
 
U.S. REE Policymaking Actors 
 
Recent decades have seen a proliferation of U.S. Government agencies 
become involved in REE policymaking activities which has made Washington 
developing an effective REE national security and domestic economic policy- 
making essentially impossible.   
    The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Strategic Materials division serves 
as the U.S.’ leading agency for analyzing, planning, procuring, and managing 
critical national security materials. DLA administers implementation and 
evaluation of Strategic and Critical Materials policies set forth by the 
National Defense Stockpile Manager and the Strategic and Critical Materials 
Stockpiling Act. Strategic Materials uses its technical expertise and geo- 
political material supply analysis to acquire, update, rotate, and dispose of 
stockpile materials provided by the Annual Materials Plan.37  
     In its Fiscal Year 2016 annual report to Congress published in January 
2017, DLA announced that it had initiated a Small Business Innovation 
Research (SBIR) program to develop economic methods for recycling REEs 
from waste and scrap streams and that the total inventory market value of the 
National Defense Stockpile was $1.15 billion on September 30, 2016.38 This 
agency’s FY 2017 Annual Materials Plan from October 1, 2016–September 
30, 2017 includes the following potential sales: 
 
Material Unit Ceiling Quantity 
Chromium, Ferro  ST 23,500 
Chromium, Metal ST 200 
Manganese, Ferro ST 50,000 
Platinum TR OZ 8,380 
Tungsten Metal, Scrap LB 190 
Tungsten Ores and Concentrates LB W 3,000,000 
Zinc ST 7,993.39 
 
 69 
DLA’s potential upgrades and disposal plans for FY 2017 include: 
Material Unit Ceiling Quantity 
Beryllium Metal ST 2 
Germanium Kg 5,000 
Manganese, Metallurgical Grade SDT 322,025 
Nickel Based Alloys LB 150,000 
Platinum-Iridium TrOz 489 
Tantalum Carbide Powder LB Ta 3,777 
Tin MT 804 
Titanium Based Alloys MT 75,000 
Tungsten Metal Powder LB W 77,433.40 
 
  In FY 2017 DOD’s potential acquisitions of strategic materials were: 
Material Unit  Ceiling Quantity 
Boron Carbide MT 1,000 
Carbon Fibers (High Strength) MT 72 
CZT (Cadmium Zinc Tellurium) Cm2 32,000 
Dysprosium Metal MT 0.5 
Europium MT 18 
Ferro-niobium MT 209 
Germanium Metal KG 1,000 
Lithium Cobalt Oxide (LCO) KG 600 
Lithium Nickel Cobalt Aluminum 
Oxide (LNCAO) 
KG 2,160 
Mesocarbon Microbeads (MCMB) KG 15,552 
Silicon Carbide Fibers LB 875 




Tungsten-3 Rhenium Metal KG 5,000 
Yttrium Oxide MT 10.41 
    
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manufacturing and Industrial Base 
Policy (MIBP) serves as the principal advisor to the Undersecretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics for: 
• DOD policies for maintaining the defense U.S. industrial base 
• Industrial base related budget matters 
• Anticipating and closing gaps in manufacturing capabilities or defense 
systems 
• Assessing impacts relating to mergers, acquisitions, and divestitures 
• Monitoring and assessing the impact of foreign investments in the U.S. 
• Executing legal authorities under 10 USC 2501 and 2505.42 
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MIBP program areas include Advanced Manufacturing Capabilities covering 
DPA Title III, manufacturing technology, and manufacturing resilience and 
assurance; Industrial Base programs covering industrial base assessments, 
fragility and criticality methodology, mergers and acquisitions under the 
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, and the Defense Priorities and Allocations System; 
Global Markets and Investments including the Treasury Department’s Com- 
mittee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), international 
industrial base collaboration, and global market trends and non-notified 
CFIUS cases; business intelligence and analytics incorporating adaptive 
learning, data and text mining, predictive modeling, visibility, risk identi- 
fication and management, efficient processes, and descriptive analysis; and 
Industry Outreach including industry and association engagement, science, 
technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) oriented industrial capa- 
bilities, and the MD5 National Security Technology Accelerator striving to 
promote civil-military industrial collaboration and venture creation by human 
centered networks to enhance DOD workforce development.43 
     MIPB’s 2017 Industrial Base Report noted that DOD had made an initial 
REE report to Congress in 2011. A March 2012 DOD report on REEs 
stressed that DOD used REEs in multiple defense applications while assert- 
ing that DOD remained committed to pursuing a tripartite approach to REE 
access including supply diversification, pursuing substitutes, and focusing on 
waste reclamation as part of larger U.S. Government recycling efforts. This 
document also contended DOD was committed to supply chain monitoring, 
preparing possible contingency plans to ensure REE availability, and imple- 
menting such plans as appropriate.44 
The newest version of this report stressed that subsequent speculation 
about future REE shortages produced speculation based rapid price increases 
and demand. These price increases saw global demand rapidly decrease 
eventually producing a countervailing reaction of supplies increasing and REE 
prices collapsing. The 2017 report noted remaining gaps in the REE domestic 
supply chain and the 2015 closing of the U.S. only active REE mining 
operation (Molycorp) in California, and stressed that the U.S. has limited 
capabilities and capacities to produce value-added rare earth containing 
minerals (e.g. separated oxides, metal, alloy and magnet materials) due to 
unfavorable market conditions and the absence of a U.S. competitive advan- 
tage. Despite this gloomy assessment, MIBP makes the following delusional 
assertion “that the supply of rare earth materials for U.S. defense is not 
presently disrupted and future shortfalls are currently not anticipated.”45  
     A third DOD entity involved in REE policymaking is the Strategic 
Materials Protection Board (SMPB). Established in 2006 by Public Law 
109–364, this organization is chaired by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy with additional 
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members including DLA’s Strategic Materials Administrator, and designees 
by the Assistant Secretary of each armed service branch for acquisition, 
research, and technology. SMPB board responsibilities include meeting at 
least one every two years with additional responsibilities encompassing: 
 
1. Determining the need to provide a long term secure supply of materials 
designated as critical to national security to ensure that national defense 
needs are met; 
2. Analyzing the risk associated with each material designated as critical to 
national security and the effect on national defense that the nonavailability 
of such material would have; 
3. Recommending a strategy to the Secretary to ensure a secure supply of 
materials designated as critical to national security; 
4. Recommending such other strategies to the Secretary as the Board 
considers appropriate to strengthen the industrial base with respect to 
materials critical to national security; and 
5. Publishing not less frequently than once every two years in the Federal     
Register recommendations regarding materials critical to national security,  
including a list of specialty metals, if any, recommended for addition to, or 
removal from, the definition of “specialty metal” for purposes of section 
2533b of this title.46 
 
Despite these lofty objectives, SMPB is a barely functioning organization.  
The only Federal Register documentation of its activities were listed in this 
publication on November 8, 2007, July 21, 2008, February 23, 2009, and 
July 29, 2009.47  
     U.S. Government REE research also occurs in the Department of Energy’s  
National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL). Aspects of NETL research 
include separating and recovering REEs from coal and coal by-products with 
a projected goal of achieving 90–99.99% high-purity, salable, individual rare 
earth metal oxides by 2020. Examples of these projects include NETL part- 
nering with Physical Sciences, Inc., to produce High Yield and Economic 
Production of REEs from Coal Ash, collaborating with the University of 
Kentucky Research Foundation to extract REEs from coal and coal by-
products using advanced separation technologies, partnering with the Univer- 
sity of North Dakota to extract REEs from coal-related feedstocks, and 
collaborating with West Virginia University to recover REEs from coal mine 
drainage. NETL has awarded contracts worth over $46 million on REE-





U.S. Government Assessments of REE Policymaking 
 
The U.S. Government’s REE policymaking programs are widely dispersed 
and have been criticized by many U.S. government policy analyses.  A July 
3, 2014 by DOD’s Office of Inspector General (DODIG) determined DOD 
did not have a comprehensive or reliable process for assessing REE supply 
and demand. DODIG also determined that DLA Strategic Materials Division 
officials failed to ensure that its modeling and simulation contractors used:  
REE supply forecasts considering market and environmental risks; complete 
REE demand survey results; and verified economic consumption data to 
forecast REE demand. Such deficiencies occurred because DLA Strategic 
Materials Division personnel did not possess adequate verification and 
validation procedures to ensure realistic supply and demand inputs and did 
not require the contractor to use an accredited model forecast REE supply 
and demand. Consequently, DOD may not have identified all REEs with 
expected shortfalls, increasing the risks that such shortfalls would negatively 
affect critical weapons systems production in the DIB and overall military 
readiness.49 
     DODIG recommendations for rectifying these deficiencies include: 
• Developing and implementing a verification and validation plan for REE 
supply and demand forecasting inputs; 
• Developing and implementing procedures to ensure that future shortfall 
analyses compare DOD demand and supply for REEs under the same 
scenarios; 
• Developing and implementing procedures for obtaining DOE REE con- 
sumption data by leveraging Service acquisition executive participation and 
other techniques as appropriate; 
• Developing and implementing an accreditation plan for the forecasting 
model’s intended use; and 
• Ensuring that current and future contracts for models, simulations, and 
associated data include verification, validation, and accreditation procedures 
in the contract requirements.50 
 
These DODIG criticisms of DOD REE policymaking were reiterated in a 
February 2016 report by the congressional Government Accountability Office 
(GAO).  GAO determined that while DOD has identified certain materials as 
critical, there was no department-wide approach for precisely defining 
“critical” or “strategic.” This semantic ambiguity is reflected in the follow- 
ing statutory definitions of critical or REEs by four different DOD organi- 
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These DOD agencies take a fragmented approach to identifying critical REEs 
with the yttrium being identified as critical by the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Defense Logistics Agency 
but not by the Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy Report and these 
same agencies identifying dysprosium as critical but not by the Manufac- 
turing and Industrial Base Policy report. These same agencies also identified 
praseodymium, neodymium, europium, gadolinium, and erbium as being 
critical but the Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy report did not.52 
     Varying perspectives and definitions of REEs occur across armed service 
branches. A laser expert at Naval Surface Warfare-Crane mentions that the 
rare earth component in certain defense lasers creates and focuses the light 
beam. Army Program Executive Office for Ammunition personnel said rare 
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earth magnets enable guided artillery ammunition to move in flight to their 
target. Army Research Laboratory officials told GAO they could sharpen 
their focus on specific rare earths if there was a DOD-wide list of REEs 
critical to national security.53 
     Other deficiencies in DOD REE policy identified by GAO included: 
• DOD identifying supply disruption risk in a limited manner and not pro- 
actively analyzing the impact of rare earths unavailability. 
• DLA Strategic Materials estimating the risk of supply shortfalls using 
national emergency scenarios limited to four year time frames and recom- 
mending materials to stockpiles. 
• These estimates cover scenarios of four years in which the first year is 
assumed to be a conflict period and years two through four are assumed to 
be a recovery period. 
• MIBP has identified some risks relating to ensuring secure rare earth 
supplies but its mitigation strategy is reactive; and 
• SMPB has not taken a broader approach to comprehensive addressing the 
underlying risks of the unavailability of rare earths.54 
 
GAO recommendations to DOD for resolving these problems include the 
Secretary of Defense: 
• Directing SMPB to designate which rare earth materials are critical to 
national security and providing a common DOD understanding of these 
materials and focusing resources. 
• Directing SMPB to analyze the effect of unavailability of national security 
critical rare earths and develop a strategy to ensure a secure supply for those 
designated critical to national security. 
• Directing MIBP to define reliable sources and secure supply for rare earths 
in measurable terms and provide metrics of its actions to better ensure con- 
tinued availability.55 
 
U.S. Rare Earth Element Reserves and Industry Developments 
 
U.S. REE reserves are scattered at many locations across the U.S. They were 
not mined domestically in 2016. The Mountain Pass, CA, site has been the 
primary center of U.S. REE mining with its peak period being between the 
mid-1960s through the 1980s. By 2000, nearly all U.S. REEs were imported, 
primarily from China. Chinese oversupply, lower cost production, various 
environmental problems, including a pipeline spill carrying contaminated 
water, and regulatory problems resulted in Molycorp’s initial production 
cessation in 2002. Under new ownership in 2008, Molycorp resumed pro- 
duction in 2008 and attempts were made to improve environmental practices.  
However, these owners have experienced repeated financial problems influ- 
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enced, in part, by Chinese export practices. During 2016 the estimated value 
of REE compounds and materials imported by the U.S. was $120 million as 
compared to $160 million in imports in 2015. Distribution of U.S. rare earths 
by end use is: 
 
Catalysts 55% 
Metallurgical Applications and Alloys 15% 
Ceramics and Glass 10% 
Polishing 10% 
Other  10%.56 
 




U.S. import sources for REEs between 2012 and 2015 included China 
72%; Estonia 7%; France 5%; Japan 5%; and other countries 11%. Imports 
of compounds and metals from these non-Chinese countries are derived from 
mineral concentrates produced in China and elsewhere. Ad valorem tariffs 
paid by the U.S. for REE imports are free for lanthanum oxides and other 
oxides, and range from 3.7% for lanthanum carbonates, other carbonates, and 
other REE compounds; 5% for scandium and yttrium whether or not mixed 
or intermixed; 5.5% for cerium compounds such as oxides; and 5.9% for 
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ferrocerium and other pyrophoric allies. REE recycling occurs in limited 
quantities from batteries, permanent magnets, and fluorescent lamps.57  
   DLA’s Annual Materials Plan for FY 2016 included a ceiling acquisition 
of 0.5 tons of dysprosium metal and 10 tons of yttrium oxide. DLA acquired 
8.8 tons of yttrium oxide during this year. Exploration and development efforts 
of REE projects within the U.S. occurring in 2017 included Bear Lodge, 
WY; Bokan Mountain, AK; Diamond Creek, ID; Elk Creek, NE; La Paz, 
AZ; Lemhi Pass-ID-MT, Pea Ridge, MO; Round Top, TX, and Thor, NV.  
Estimated U.S. REE reserves are 1,400,000 tons.58 
     Declining mineral prices and unsustainable debt forced Molycorp, Inc., 
the owner of the Mountain Pass, CA, REE mine, to file for bankruptcy in 
June 2015.   
During June 2016, an investor group with alleged ties to the Chinese 
Government purchased Molycorp raising the possibility that CFIUS would 
intervene to stop the sale on national security grounds. The case remains 
under litigation in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Delaware District.  
During July 2017, American Elements Corp. Chief Executive Officer 
Michael Silver publicly advocated to former Trump Administration officials 
Steve Bannon, Sebastian Gorka, and Reince Preibus that the U.S. should 
nationalize Molycorp’s Mountain Pass mine on national security grounds.59 
 
Specific U.S. Weapons Systems using REEs 
 
REEs have become increasingly important to a growing number of U.S. 
defense applications. General REE defense applications include precision-
guided missiles, smart bombs, and aircraft. Additional military relevant REE 
applications include: 
• Smaller and lighter weapons systems magnets; 
• Fin actuators in missile guidance and control systems, controlling the 
direction of the missile; 
• Disk drive motors installed in aircraft, tanks, missile systems, and com- 
mand and control centers; 
• Lasers for enemy mine detection, interrogators, underwater mines, and 
countermeasures; 
• Satellite communications, radar, and sonar on submarines and surface 
ships; and 
• Optical equipment and speakers.60 
 





Figure 14 Rare Earth Elements in Guidance and Control Systems 
 
 
Figure 15 Rare Earth Elements in Defense Electronic Warfare 
 
 
Figure 16 Rare Earth Elements in Targeting and Weapon Systems 
 
Source: Congressional Research Service 
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Recent Congressional REE Legislation 
 
Recent Congressional sessions have regularly seen legislation proposed to 
address the strategic importance of REE and rectify the U.S. dependence on 
these materials from unreliable foreign sources. On November 16, 2011, Rep. 
Paul Ryan (R-WI) introduced H.R. 3449 requiring DOD to develop a defense 
supply chain and industrial base strategy to secure the U.S. supply chain and 
industrial base sectors the Secretary of Defense considers critical to U.S. 
national security. H.R. 4402, the National Strategic and Critical Materials 
Protection Act of 2012 passed the House on July 12, 2012, and was referred 
to the Senate four days later. It would have required both the Secretaries of 
the Interior and Agriculture to more efficiently develop domestic mineral 
and materials sources of strategic and critical importance to U.S. economic 
and national security, and manufacturing competitiveness.61 
     On March 26, 2015, Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee 
Chair Lisa Murkowski (R-AK) introduced S. 883 The American Mineral 
Security Act of 2015. This proposed legislation would have required the 
USGS to consult with other federal agencies and invite public comment on a 
draft methodology for determining which minerals qualify as critical and 
subject to potential supply restrictions stemming from foreign political risk, 
abrupt demand growth, military conflict, violent unrest, anti-competitive or 
protectionist behaviors, and are important in energy technology, defense, 
currency, agriculture, consumer electronics and health related applications.  
A detailed hearing was held on this legislation by this committee on May 12, 
2015, but no further action was taken on this legislation during the 114 th 
Congress in 2015–2016.62 
     REE-related congressional legislation introduced during 2017 includes 
H.R. 1407 Materials Essential to American Leadership and Security Act by 
Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-CA) calling for the U.S. to develop a domestic in- 
dustrial base for producing strategic and critical materials, divesting the U.S. 
from dependence on critical foreign-produced strategic and critical materials, 
and creating a fund using 1% of internal programmatic administrative costs 
of major aircraft and missile systems to promote investment in domestic 
production of critical and strategic materials; and H.R. 2053 Mining School 
Enhancement Act by Rep. Martha McSally (R-AZ) et al. calling for amend- 
ing the 1977 Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act by enhancing 
financial support for mining engineering programs at U.S. educational insti- 
tutions by reducing dependence on foreign energy supplies, enhancing the 
competitiveness of U.S. energy technology exports, and augmenting “the 
extraction or processing of coinciding mineralization, including rare earth 
elements, within coal, coal processing byproduct, overburden or coal residue.”63 
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On October 12, 2017, Senate Judiciary Committee Chair Charles Grassley 
(R-IA) wrote letters to various cabinet department heads, following up on 
June 30, 2015, letters to CFIUS agency leaders expressing concern about 
acquisition of U.S.-based Uranium One by the Atomredmetzoloto (ARMZ) 
subsidiary of the Russian state energy company Rosatom. This purchase gave 
the Russian Government 20% of U.S. uranium production capacity which 
Grassley’s letter expressed concern with while also noting that Uranium One 
Chair Ian Telfer had made donations of over $1 million to the Clinton 
Foundation. Grassley’s letter to these CFIUS agency leaders requested that 
respondents answer the following questions and requests by October 26, 2017: 
• List the dates of each CFIUS meeting involving the Uranium One/Rosatom 
transaction, attendees by agency, and all relevant transcripts and communi- 
cations. 
• Whether agency personnel assigned to this transaction knew of ongoing 
criminal and intelligence investigation into senior managers of Rosatom and 
Tenex and Tenam before CFIUS’ October 2010 approval of the Uranium One 
transaction? 
• Provide a copy of the analysis that articulated the risk and vulnerabilities 
presented by the transaction and any mitigation terms considered. 
• Provide a copy of all records related to the presentation provided by 
Uranium One/Rosatom to CFIUS staffers prior to filing a formal notice on 
August 4, 2010. 
• Provide a copy of your agency’s official confirmation to Treasury that the 
transaction did not raise any unresolved national security concerns. 
• Provide all records relating to your agency’s determination that the Uranium 
One/Rosatom transaction did not raise any unresolved national security 
concerns. 
• Provide all records relating to communications with respect to Secretary 
Clinton and donations to the Clinton Foundation by parties interested in the 
Uranium One/Rosatom transaction.64 
 
Trump Administration Policy Actions 
 
The Trump Administration’s opening months have seen some tentative 
evidence that it may take a more serious geopolitical approach to REEs and 
other strategic materials critical to U.S. national security. Executive Order 
13788 Buy American and Hire American signed on April 18, 2017, required 
executive branch U.S. agencies to privilege purchasing American products 
including those “produced in the United States such as all stages of iron, 
steel, and manufactured goods from the initial melting stage through the 
application of coatings occurring in the U.S. It also called for federal agencies 
to “scrupulously, monitor, enforce, and comply with Buy American Laws.”  
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A June 20, 2017, memorandum from the Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics to various DOD and 
armed services acquisition authorities stressed that DODIG audits of com- 
pliance with the Berry Amendment and Buy American Act had found 
numerous contracts where these statutes should have been included in con- 
tracts, but were not such as a July 7, 2017, DODIG report finding that DLA 
had only complied Berry Amendment provisions in 13 of 32 contracts 
reviewed with the non-compliant 19 contracts totaling $453.2 million.65 
     On July 21, 2017 President Trump issued Executive Order (EO) 13806 
“Strengthening Defense Industrial Base & Supply Chain Security.” This 
document called for the Secretaries of Defense, Commerce, Interior, Labor, 
Homeland Security, and Health and Human Services, in consultation with 
the Directors of Office of Management and Budget, National Intelligence, 
the National Security Advisor, Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, 
Director of the Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, and other relevant 
policymakers to prepare a report within 270 days (by April 17, 2018) 
containing classified and unclassified assessments of the U.S. manufacturing 
capacity, defense industrial base, and supply chain resiliency. 
     Specific contents of this report include: 
• Identifying military and civilian material, raw materials, other goods 
essential to national security; 
• Identifying manufacturing capabilities essential to producing these goods 
including emerging capabilities; 
• Identifying defense, intelligence, homeland, economic, natural, geopolitical, 
or other contingencies capable of disrupting, straining, compromising, or 
eliminating supply chains of these goods; 
• Assessing the resilience and capacity of U.S. manufacturing and defense 
industrial base and supply chains to support national security needs including 
current domestic education and manufacturing workforce skills, exclusive or 
dominant supply of goods or components by or through nations likely to 
become unfriendly or unstable; and the availability of substitutes or alternative 
sources of these goods; 
• Identifying the causes of any aspect of the defense industrial base or 
national-security-related supply chains assessed as deficient; and 
• Recommending legislative, policy, and regulatory changes by the President 
or other agency heads, based on a reasoned assessment that the benefits of 
such changes outweigh costs, to disruptions to U.S. national security supply 
chains and strengthen the U.S. manufacturing capacity and defense industrial 
base resiliency.66 
 
The September 5, 2017, Federal Register saw the Commerce Department’s  
Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) seek public comment by October 5, 
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2017, on the potential market impact of the proposed FY 2019 National 
Defense Stockpile Annual Materials Plan. This plan is compiled by the Com- 
merce and State Department co-chaired Domestic Stockpile Market Impact 
Committee on the projected defense and foreign economic effects of all 
acquisitions, conversions, and disposals involving the stockpile and related 
material research and development projects as stipulated by the 1979 
Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Revision Act of 1979.67 
     In addition to being chaired by Commerce and State, the Domestic Stock- 
pile Market Impact Committee includes from representatives from Agricul- 
ture, Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, and Treasury Departments and  
portions of the proposed FY 2019 Materials Plan calls for potentially 
disposing of 6 tons of beryllium metal and 190 pounds of tantalum scrap; the 
potential acquisition of 0.5 metric tons of dysprosium, 416 metric tons of 
REEs, and 100 metric tons of rare earth magnet feedstock; potential conver- 
sions (upgrading, rotating, and reprocessing) of 72 metric tons of dysprosium 
and 416 metric tons of rare earth elements; and the potential recovery from 
government sources of 25 metric tons of lithium ion precursors, 100 metric 
tons of rare earth elements-magnets, and 10 metric tons of tantalum.68 
     On September 13, 2017, Trump issued an administrative order prohibit- 
ing Chinese acquisition of Lattice Semiconductor Corporation citing section 
721 of the 1950 DPA that Canyon Bridge Acquisition Company and Hong-
Kong based Yitai and its parent company China Venture Capital Fund Cor- 
poration Limited could threaten U.S. national security by exercising control 
over Lattice. This order directed the purchasers and Lattice to permanently 
abandon this transaction within 30 days unless CFIUS extends abandoning 
this order up to 90 days and requires the Purchasers and Lattice to inform 
CFIUS in writing that the proposed transaction has been abandoned with the 




Multiple decades of U.S. Government policymaking on strategic materials, 
including REEs, have created a policymaking structure of labyrinthine com- 
plexity producing bureaucratic sclerosis at a time when the U.S.’ economy 
and defense weapons systems have become increasingly dependent on REEs 
requiring agile response capabilities to counter potential supply disruptions.  
There are several steps the U.S. Government should consider taking to en- 
hance domestic REE development and lessen national security supply chain 
disruptions. 
    An initial critical step is expediting the permitting process for approving 
new mines. The U.S. has one of the longest global mining permitting proc- 
esses often requiring nearly ten years to complete depending on project com- 
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plexity. This is expensive from the perspectives of industry and regulators, 
creates uncertain outcomes, discourages investment in U.S. mining, and con- 
tributes to offshoring of mining and manufacturing and increased U.S. import 
dependency. Testifying before a House Natural Resources Committee Sub- 
committee on October 10, 2013, West Virginia Coal Association Senior Vice 
President and Chair Chris R. Hamilton stressed that nearly 1/3 of U.S. coal 
mines operating in 2008 had closed by 2013 impacting both surface and 
underground mines. Such actions have also affected the U.S. critical minerals 
industry with some laws providing opportunities to delay, stop, and require 
major modifications making projects become economically unfeasible due to 
the risk of litigation. Voluminous federal mining regulations covering three 
volumes and exceeding 2,200 pages in Title 30 of the 2017 Code of Federal 
Regulations already govern U.S. mining activity sufficiently ensuring mineral 
extraction industries comply with environmental regulations.70 
    The U.S. should also seriously consider nationalizing indigenous REE 
reserves and mines to prevent possible takeover by unreliable and unfriendly 
foreign suppliers. This would be a controversial step that would go against 
the traditional free market leanings of a Republican presidential administration 
and Congress. The Heritage Foundation has contended that the U.S. should 
cheaply import REEs, that the U.S. should not subsidize technologies the 
private sector won’t invest in, and that the federal government should open 
access to REEs in states where they are known to exist and establish suf- 
ficient regulatory frameworks proving companies with the certainty needed 
to extract REEs. China’s temporary 2010 embargo on REE exports casts 
doubt on the notion that the U.S. can consistently reply on a dependable REE 
supply chain from non-allied countries.71 
     Another problematic precedent to government nationalization of a major 
industry is provided by the Truman Administration’s attempted takeover of 
the U.S. steel industry during the Korean War. This action was protested by 
the steel industry and resulted in the 1952 U.S. Supreme Court ruling in 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer that the President did not have the 
inherent authority to seize private property without specifically enumerated 
authority in Article 2 of the U.S. Constitution or congressionally confirmed 
legal authority.72 
     Potential U.S. tax reform legislation during the Trump Administration 
should also consider tax incentives to the U.S. mineral resources industry to 
facilitate exploration and develop of national REE resources. Consequently, 
the Trump Administration’s review of the U.S. defense industrial base and 
supply chain capacity mandated by EO 13866 should also seriously consider 
whether nationalizing REE resources is an essential national security objective 
given the increasing use of REEs in U.S. weapons systems and civilian 
technological applications and be prepared to defend this in court. 
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     The U.S. should also require the military and defense industry to take all 
steps necessary to acquire REEs from U.S. companies and from companies 
from defense treaty allied countries; the U.S. should take appropriate admin- 
istrative and regulatory action to require CFIUS to prohibit non-defense treaty 
aligned foreign companies or countries from acquiring U.S. REE industries; 
Congress should explicitly link DLA and MIBP budget appropriations to how 
effectively they strengthen U.S. defense access to REEs; Congress should 
legislate that only one DOD agency have responsibility for rare earth and 
strategic minerals policymaking and consider dissolving the SMPB due to its 
inactivity; Congress should restrict jurisdiction over defense REE programs 
to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees due to the increasing 
criticality of these programs to U.S. national security; and Congress should 
continue providing financial incentives to promote REE education, research, 




REE’s have become critically important to U.S. economic development and 
national security. A 2014 assessment by the National Center for Policy 
Analysis maintains REEs support more than $298 billion in revenue from 
downstream economic activity, 535,000 U.S. jobs, and over $33 billion in 
payrolls.73 Relying on unreliable and even hostile foreign suppliers of REEs 
such as Afghanistan, China, and others is geopolitical folly of the highest 
order! The U.S. must ensure that it provides effective regulatory, research 
and development, and tax incentives to its REE industry to ensure it can 
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